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BENDER SHIPBUILDING & REPAIR CO., INC. v. BRASILEIRO 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 13 June 1989 
874 F.2d 1551 
A marine insurance Builder's Risk policy including protection and indemnity is not intended to incorporate insured's 
contractual liability to a co-insured for liquidated damages. 
FACTS: Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc. !"Bender") 
contracted to build a floating dry dock for Todd Shipyards Corpo­
ration ("Todd"). Bender agreed to construct and deliver the 
drydock on or before May 27, 1982. The contract provided for a 
liquidated damages payment of $5,300.00 per day beyond the 
delivery date for a maximum period of 90 days. 
Bender purchased a Builder's Risk insurance policy from The 
Hartford Insurance Company of Alabama !"Hartford"). The 
purpose of the policy was to cover the floating drydock during 
construction and delivery. Under this policy, Bender and Todd 
were listed as co-insured and co-loss payees. 
On July 6, 1982, a severe storm caused three sections of the 
drydock at Bender's yard to break their moorings and be blown 
west across the Mobile River. On the western bank of the river 
the floating drydock collided with the M!V Itapura, a moored 
vessel. The floating drydock and the M/V Itapura were 
damaged. Repairs of the dry dock delayed delivery to Todd. 
Todd instituted a claim for liquidated damages for delay of 
delivery of the drydock pursuant to the contract with Bender. 
Bender sought coverage for the 1 iquidated damages claim under 
the Hartfnrd n-Jl1cy. Hartford denied coverage. Bender paid 
Todd $353, 1�7 .26 in February of 1983 under a joint agreement 
and mutual release of claims. 
Bender instituted suit against Hartford on November 22, 1985 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Alabama. As it was agreed by the parties that no genuine issues 
of material fact existed, the suit was brought before the district 
court on Hartford's motion for summary judgment and Bender's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court denied 
Hartford's summary judgment motion on the basis that its 
burden to demonstrate "clearly and unambiguously" that no 
coverage was intended was not met. Bender's cross-motion for 
summary judgment was granted as the court concluded that "no 
clear language in the policy demonstrated an intent. . .  to exclude 
from the coverage liquidated damages resulting from a colli­
sion ... . " Hartford made an interlocutory appeal of the order 
granting summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. §1292!aH3J. 
ISSUES: ! 1 l Whether a marine insurance Builder's Risk policy 
is intended to incorporate insured's contractual liability to a 
co-insured for liquidated damages under its Collision Liability 
clause·} 
!2l D1d the district court err by adjudicating 
pendant state law issues between a shipbuilder and insurer 
when juris-diction was based upon Admiralty"� 
ANALYSIS: In its reversal of the lower court, the Eleventh 
Circuit rendered judgment for Hartford because the policy was 
unambiguous and indicated no intention to cover liquidated 
damages owed by Bender to Todd pursuant to their contract. 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the distnct court that an 
msurance policy should be construed against the insurer which 
is in a better pos1tion to limit its exposure to liability. However, 
the court pointed out that this construction does not include 
every risk that is not specifically excluded. 
The provisions of the policy purchased by Bender were 
threefold, including hull, liability !protection and indemnity! 
and general conditions. Excluded from coverage under general 
condttions was ·· 'delay or disruption of any type whatsoever, 
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including, but not limited to, loss of earnings or use of the 
Vessel, howsoever caused, except to the extent, if any, covered 
by the Collision Liability or the Protection and Indemnity 
clauses of this Policy.' " Bender argued for coverage under the 
Collision Liability or "Running Down" clause which provided: 
"lilf the Vessel shall come into collision with any other ship or 
vessel, and the Assured ... in consequence of the Vessel being at 
fault shall become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages 
to any other person ... the Underwriters will pay the Assured ... . " 
The protection of the Collision Liability clause must be determined 
by looking at the reasonable understanding. of the parties. 
Harbor Towing Corp. v. Atlantic Mut.Ins. Co., 189 F.2d 409 !4th 
Cir. 195U. Hartford did not undertake contractual risks of 
which it apparently had no knowledge. The court determined 
that such an expansion of Hartford's own risk overextends the 
"reasonable expectations of both insurer and insured." The 
court expressed that an extension of the coverage of the Collision 
Liability clause to the risks created by the Bender-Todd contract 
would cause higher premiums, generally undesirable in the 
maritime industry. 
Historically, the Collision Liability clause limited underwriter 
liability to indemnification of shipowners for damages done to 
other vessels by the insured vessel. General Mut Ins Co. v. 
Sherwood (The Emily), 55 U.S. ( 14 How.) 35 1 <1853). Bender 
argues that the Collision Liability clause has been held to cover 
contractual liabilities which arise out of a collision. Marine 
Transit Corp. v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 
544 (2d Cir. 1933). Bender's effort to avoid exclusion under the 
"delay and disruption damages" clause, as provided for under 
the general policy conditions, fails here. The court illustrated 
that the cargo under contract in Marine Transit was on a vessel 
other than the insured's, whereas Bender's liability arose from a 
contract involving the insured vessel itself. 
The status of Todd and Bender as co-insureds and co-loss 
payees caused the district court to find liquidated damages 
payable to Todd as damages from loss of use of the drydock. The 
district court erroneously relied on the Collision Liability clause 
in allowing an insured to collect for damage on its own vessel. 
Further, Todd's status precluded its qualification as "any other 
person" within the meaning of the Collision Liability clause. 
The collision between the floating drydock and the M!V Itapura 
was on navigable waters. The nexus between the alleged wrong­
ful conduct and some maritime activity established admiralty 
jurisdiction in tort. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 
668 ! 1982!; Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 
249 !_1972!. Maritime jurisdiction over the collision gave the 
dtstn�t court d1scretwn to hear pendant state law claims arising 
out of the same transactiOn and occurrence. Hagans v. Lavine 
4 15 U.S. 528 ( 1974). The resolutwn of the admiralty claim did 
not bar the d1stnct court from retammg pendant Jurisdiction 
over the Issue of msurance coverage, a related state claim. 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 <1966). 
The court of appeals reversed the district court's summary 
judgment for Bender finding that the Bender-Todd contract was 
not incorporated into the Builder's Risk policy and that the 
liquidated damages paid by Bender to Todd were not intended to 
be covered under the policy. 
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